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Using the recent Griswold case as a starting point, Professor Pollack
discusses various jurisprudential philosophies and their applications
in the constitutional sphere. He evaluates the approaches taken by
the absolutists, the advocates of the balancing-of-interests test and
the proponents of the libertarian theory. The author further dis-
cusses these interpretations with reference to the significant Supreme
Court decisions which have utilized them. He concludes that the
lack of a unital philosophy in the Supreme Court may very well be
a contributing factor to the success of our democracy.
In a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States,
the Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute was declared unconstitu-
tional.1 Justice Douglas, who delivered the opinion of the Court, held
that the statute violates a constitutional right of privacy emanating
from several provisions of the Bill of Rights. Moving beyond the
more traditional concepts of freedom, as in desegregation, this ruling
and the concurring and dissenting opinions of the Court reflected such
marked differences of legal theory and jural method as to invite
comment and discussion.
If viewed sui generis, the issues raised by the decision fall into
four distinguishable, yet to some degree overlapping, categories: (1)
the authoritative function of the state; (2) the judicial function; (3)
the identification and distinction between applicable legal concepts;
and (4) the scope of natural rights.
I. THE AUTHORITATIVE FUNCTION OF THE STATE
The framers of our constitution, deriving their political theories
from Locke and others, conceived that the individual possessed certain
indefeasible, primary rights, and that the function of the state was
* Professor of Law and Director of Research Services, The Ohio State University
College of Law.
1 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479 (1965).
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to protect these rights against governmental intrusion or group en-
croachment.
This concept of natural rights developed through the interpretation
of natural-law principles, and gave validity and efficacy to such rights
through the application of the law of nature. It reflected a change of
emphasis from classical construction, with its duties and prohibitions,
to that of fundamental democratic rights, with accompanying restric-
tions placed on the authority of the state. In this sense, the American
Constitution, strongly suggestive of Locke's philosophy, emphasizes
individual freedom with limitations on governmental power. Thus,
natural rights are subject to legal guarantees embodied in the Constitu-
tion or they are protected by secular law. In this milieu, machinery is
created to give natural rights a legal status and to gain for them
recognition and protection as legal rights.
The word "rights" has a very precise meaning which is distinctively
different from its popular definition. Professor Mark De Wolfe Howe
carefully made this distinction.
As I read the original Constitution and its Bill of Rights it expounds
a political theory which is grounded in the belief that liberty is
the by-product of limitations on governmental power, not the
objective of its delegation.... These distinctions I believe to be of
profound importance. When they are forgotten we begin to use the
word "rights" . . . in misleading ways. Our rights, as the framers
conceived them, were essentially certain specified immunities. They
were not claims on, but assurances against the government ...
The Bill of Rights defines our immunities; it does not catalogue
our claims. 2
Such identification has been characterized as commonplace 3;
however, its simplicity is misleading since there has been little con-
sensus and many significant departures from this meaning. Explana-
tions have ranged from a formative definition of immunity to modem
identifications as interests, claims, or privileges. In the latter settings,
prohibitions of the Constitution are admonitional which Congress
may or may not observe.
2 Hutchins, Two Faces of Federalism 5 (1961).
In opposing the Bill of Rights as being unnecessary, Alexander Hamilton expressed
a similar thought. He stated that ours is a government of delegated powers and that it
was not granted the power to intrude upon basic individual rights. Federalist No. 84, at
578-79 (Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
3 Professor William Van Alstyne made the passing comment: "After all, even the
least sophisticated student appreciates the fact that the fourteenth amendment does not
grant or establish anything as a legal right; it merely provides a limited immunity
against state divestiture of certain prerogatives which all persons may claim as human
beings." "Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of State Action,"
1965 Duke L.J. 219-20.
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Justice Black has made his disagreement with the latter view well
known.4 In his famous James Madison Lecture at New York Univer-
sity, he said: "It is my belief that there are "absolutes" in our Bill of
Rights, and that they were put there on purpose by men who knew
what words meant, and meant their prohibitions to be 'absolutes.'5"
Framed in history and language, he described this limitation on
governmental power as plain, offering no exceptions. "If the Constitu-
tion withdraws from Government all power over subject matter in an
area, such as religion, speech, press, assembly, and petition, there is
nothing over which authority may be exerted."6
In describing the "rights" enumerated in the Bill of Rights as
immunities, Professor Howe was equally Hohfeldian in his thinking.
If the "rights" are immunities, then the government's power to inter-
fere with individual liberties is limited, for these "rights" were
reserved by the people to themselves. However, once classified as
coming within the category of constitutional rights, a right is absolute
and cannot legally be limited by governmental action.
Under the Constitution, an immunity is a freedom of an individual
from having a given legal relation altered by an act of the government.
But this meaning, as Justice Black acknowledged, is not without its
complexities. If applied without exception or qualification, it could
defeat the very objectives of a free society which fosters it. To ensure
continuous freedom of its people, a free government must legislate
restrictions. Any other arrangement could result in anarchy or even
institutional collapse. Locke recognized this fact and cautioned that
the natural liberty of the individual is not suggestive of total freedom
from legal restraint, for "in all the states of created beings capable
of laws, where there is no law, there is no freedom."' Thus, "the
end of law is not to abolish or restrain but to preserve and enlarge
freedom."8
Paradoxically, the immunity principle cannot be exercised by
government without restriction; yet, the principle does not allow for
ordinary restraints essential to the normal function of government, for
it is an unqualified denial of power of the government to engage in
enumerated functions.
4 E.g., Black, "The Bill of Rights," 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 865 (1960); "Justice Black
and First Amendment 'Absolutes': A Public Interview," 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 549 (1962)
5 Id. at 867. For comments on the absolute approach, see Griswold, "Absolute is
in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme Court to Constitutional
Questions," 8 Utah L. Rev. 167 (1963) and books and articles listed, at 169 n.8.
0 Id. at 875.
7 Second Treatise of Civil Government § 57, at 148 (Cook ed. 1947).
8 Ibid.
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However, the absolutists do not accept this approach to the Bill
of Rights. As Justice Black indicated, "Nobody has ever said that the
First Amendment gives people a right to go anywhere in the world they
want to go or say anything in the world they want to say."9 Referring
to the aphorism about shouting "fire" in a crowded theater, Justice
Black described this conduct as a disturbance, having nothing to do
with free speech or what is exclaimed. If the individual stood up during
a musical show and recited the lines of Invictus, this would be equally
disturbing and would constitute disorderly conduct. The basis of the
disorder is not what is shouted but that the person shouted. However,
in this situation the absolutist departs from the immunity rule and
weighs the right to speak against peaceful conduct and chooses the
latter course, thus ensuring the exercise of orderly government. But
despite its practical import, this restriction is a departure from the
principle of immunity.
The late Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, a leading advocate of
the absolute doctrine, introduced further anomalies into the immunity
rule. He acknowledged that certain forms of speech require regulation
and exclusion from constitutional protection.'0 The primary com-
mercial purposes of advertising, lobbyist activities and radio remove
them from this safeguard. In fact, Professor Meiklejohn suggested
that phases of individual scholarship may reach a position requiring
abridgment to safeguard human welfare." Such blurred distinctions
bring to mind Justice Frankfurter's admonition, "Absolute rules
would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and such exceptions
would eventually corrode the rules."'"
The basic conflict in the absolutist's position is patent. If a "right"
is an immunity and under an immunity a state has no power to restrain
the individual, how can any governmental restraint of a right, even
the inoffensive and essential, be indulged? The state has no such
power and to allow its invocation is to introduce a new meaning into
"right."M 3
9 Black, supra note 4, at 558.
10 Meiklejohn, Free Speech 39, 104 (1948).
11 Id. at 99-100. Professor Chafee was critical of this view. Book Review, 62 Harv.
L. Rev. 891, 900 (1949).
12 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524 (1951).
13 Mr. justice Black, it would seem, avoided this dilemma by using the Hegelian
dialectic with its synthesis of opposites. The dialectic thesis is: Freedom of speech may
not be abridged under the first amendment of the Constitution. Its opposite, the
antithesis, is: Consistent with maintenance of order and the protection of life, freedom
of speech may be abridged. The synthesis follows: Freedom of speech may not be
abridged, in its non-literal sense, but the right to expressive or inciting speech may be
deprived. But this merely avoids the "immunity" problem; it does not answer it.
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In another respect, the absolutists argue that the prohibitions of
the Constitution are more than admonitions which government can
abandon at will. Justice Black made a dual charge against this constitu-
tional interpretation. He stated that the language of the Constitution
and Bill of Rights is clear and had an unobscure meaning to the
draftsmen. In addition, the history and purposes of the Bill of Rights
"point to the creation of a government which was denied all power to
do some things under any and all circumstances and all power to do
other things except precisely in the manner prescribed." 4
This unital theory reflects concern with limitation on power but
not with policy. It has been suggested that such narrow interpreta-
tion is foreign to Locke's thinking. 5 Locke's famous discourse on
civil government was inspired by a number of events, beginning with
an attempt of the House of Stuart to establish an absolute monarchy
and culminating in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. But the dis-
course had more than one dimension. Locke's essay secured the
throne of "the Great Restorer" and made good his title "in the con-
sent of the people." But it also implicitly contained the classical prin-
ciple of the "common good," imbuing the doctrine with purpose. Thus,
the concept falls markedly short of absolute rights.
Professor Walton Hamilton demonstrated this view in relation
to Locke's concept of property. He characterized the modem inter-
pretation of the Lockian theory in these words:
The background of Locke's thought was forgotten; his silences were
overlooked; the conditions and preadventures in his argument were
brushed aside. His propositions no longer limited in meaning by
his reasons, became general truths; his expediencies, freed from
the exigencies of cause and occasion, blossomed out as cardinal
principles of government. 16
The property which Locke described as a natural right was per-
sonal, based on labor, and the natural right to appropriate to one's
own use included land as well as produce. His limited concept of prop-
erty was appropriate for a society where the owner managed his own
14 Black, supra note 4, at 867. Madison explained that the Bill of Rights was
intended to limit and qualify the power of government "by excepting out of the grant
of power these cases in which the Government ought not to act, or to act only in a
particular mode." 1 Annals of Cong. 437 (1789).
15 Hamilton, "Property-According to Locke," 41 Yale LJ. 864 (1932).
On the other hand, Rousseau's philosophy provided a more absolutistic formula.
He prescribed natural rights in terms agreeable to the common man and evolved a
philosophy of democracy which was founded on equalitarian principles. Locke's theory
is noticeably deficient in this latter regard.
16 Id. at 872.
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lands or the craftsman labored in his own shop. Locke did not con-
ceive of industrial wealth and capital or property-separable-from-per-
sonality. Locke thought of liberty and property as synonymous. As
the creation of man, property attained a sacredness identifiable with
personality.
But Professor Hamilton further commented:
Neither "liberty" nor "property" is antecedent to the state or
beyond the domain of public control. Each is but a name for a duster
of prevailing usages, -- certain to change and subject to amend-
ment, -which binds the individual to the social order. The property
which Locke justified by natural right was an isolated possession
of personal origin; the property which is the concern of constitu-
tional law is an aggregate of rights inseparable from the gigantic
collectivism of business. 17
And so it is with other natural rights.
This ideological disunity focuses attention on the flexibility of
the formative philosophy in America. Locke's political thought makes
sense only when recognized as a rationalization of the Whig Revolu-
tion. As applied to conditions in the American Colonies, it became as-
sertive and aspirational-an effective instrumentality to further
the American Revolution. As a formula for implementing governmental
functions, with essential operative restraints, it fostered problems and
dilemmas.
II. THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
The Founding Fathers did not view the Constitution as a static,
fixed instrument, with its interpretation set by historic principle.
Proceeding on the theory of the consent of the governed, Jefferson
recognized the evanescent quality of the Constitution and the law.
In a letter to Madison in 1789, he urged that each generation should
renew that consent if the law is to possess obligatory strength. He
said, ". . .no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a
perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation."'"
Jefferson's suggestion presented practical difficulties, since it was
fraught with legal uncertainty and political instability. However, such
limitations did not foreclose the constitutional growth which Jefferson
recognized as essential to a progressive society. Constitutional develop-
ment was introduced by judicial interpretation, simultaneously
allowing for structural stability in government. 19
17 Id. at 879.
Is Letter to James Madison, September 6, 1789, Basic Writings of Thomas
Jefferson 591 (Foner ed. 1944).
19 It has been suggested that the range of judicial interpretation of the Constitution
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This judicial dynamism has been described by Justice Holmes
with characteristic succinctness and clarity:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act,
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they
have called into life a being the development of which could not
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted begetters. It was
enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an orga-
nism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much
sweat and blood to prove that they had created a nation. The case
before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience
and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.20
In an earlier period John Marshall also invoked this principle
but minimized the judicial role and the developmental attributes of
the judicial process. He stated:
A constitution, to contain as accurate detail of all the subdivisions
of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which
they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity
of a legal code, and could scarely be embraced by the human mind.
It would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature,
therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be marked,
its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which
compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves. That this idea was entertained by the framers of the
American constitution, is not only to be inferred from the nature
of the instrument, but from the language.21
In deemphasizing the judicial function and describing its role as
minor, Marshall did not anticipate either the range of problems or
the divergence of ideologies which an industrial era would create.
Neither was he aware of the cleavages which these philosophical
theories would produce.
The view that the Constitution is not time-bound in interpretation
is subject to one sobering, qualifying consideration. As one authority
suggests, there is a distinction between modifications and subversion
extends from free wheeling judicial legislation as described by judge Learned Hand to the
narrow judicial practices of the House of Lords. Wechsler, "The Courts and the
Constitution," 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1011-12 (1965). Professor Wechsler's "neutral
principles" is an intermediate explanation of judicial action. Ibid. See Wechsler, "Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959), reprinted in
Wechsler, Principles, Politics and Fundamental Laws 3 (1961). An evaluation of these
processes would require separate consideration and would be a departure from the main
theme.
20 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
21 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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of a constitutional provision through interpretation. 22 Sanctions per-
mitted to ensure the safety of the nation, which restrict freedom of
speech, such as incitement to race riots, are constitutionally allowed.
But interpretations of free speech under the Constitution, which for
a slight reason would permit the legislature to suspend such guaranty,
are disallowed.
Another theory of interpretation of the Constitution has been
enunciated. Described as the historical interpretation, it prescribes
that constitutional uncertainties should be resolved in accordance
with the meanings of its terms prevalent at the time of its adoption.
This view was endorsed by Chief Justice Taney and Mr. Justice
Sutherland. In a vibrant dissent in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
which invoked the constitutional validity of the minimum wage law
of the State of Washington, Justice Sutherland said:
[T]he meaning of the Constitution does not change with the ebb
and flow of economic events. We frequently are told in more
general words that the Constitution must be construed in the light
of the present. If by that it is meant that the Constitution is made
up of living words that apply to every new condition which they
include, the statement is quite true. But to say, if that be intended,
that the words of the Constitution mean today what they did not
mean when written-that is, that they do not apply to a situation
now to which they would have applied then-is to rob that instru-
ment of the essential element which continues it in force....23
The issues of judicial review and judicial restraint as applicable
to the Court are beyond the purview of this discussion.2 4 The words
in the Constitution are mere symbols which have been given a variety
of meanings. The constancy of the symbols provide an illusion of
fixity and certainty in the law, but their application permits a wide
range of jural construction. By injecting new or varying content into
old phrases, the Supreme Court constantly amends the Constitution.
Paraphrasing Justice Holmes, the Constitution is what the courts say
it is. It is to this that we owe its vitality, resiliency and longevity.
Such continuing jural conflict is reflected in the Supreme Court's
decision in the Griswold case, in which the majority endorsed Holmes'
view and dissenting Justices Black and Stewart followed the historical
approach.
22 Bodenheimner, Jurisprudence 352 (1962).
23 300 U.S. 379, 402-03 (1937).
24 The literature on the topics is voluminous. For recent articles and bibliographic
treatment see Strong, "Toward an Acceptable Function of Judicial Review?" 11 S.D.L.
Rev. 1 (1966) and Shapiro, "Judicial Modesty: Down With the OldI-Up With the
New?" 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 533 (1963).
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III. LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AND JURAI. SYSTEMS
The indiscriminate use of the term "rights" to describe an im-
munity or a privilege has fostered confusion in the law. As has often
been stated, our constitutional government was originally framed on
a system of limited powers, reserving rights in individuals. However,
what were reserved in this context were not actually rights but
immunities-restraints on the government.
What then is a right? A right is a legally enforceable claim of
one person against another or against the state requiring that the
person or the state shall do a given act or shall not do a given act.25
The relationship can be identified from the standpoint of the individual
or state against whom the claim exists. The latter has a duty or a
legally enforceable obligation to do or not to do an act. However, in
this repect, duty has been given another meaning. Under the Classical
Natural Law theory, the person with a "right" is also under a duty.20
Thus, rights and duties are linked in the one person. These rights
are not absolute, but neither can duties and social consequences of
acts be ignored. Pope John illustrated such reciprocity between rights
and duties:
[T]he rights of every man to life is correlative with the duty to
preserve it; his right to a decent standard of living, with the duty
of living it becomingly; and his right to investigate the truth freely,
with the duty of pursuing it ever more completely and profoundly.27
Both the immunity concept and the Classical viewpoint were
25 See definition in 1 Restatement, Property § 1 (1936); Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions As Applied In Judicial Reasoning 6, 36-38 (1923).
26 See Encycl. Pacem in Terris of John XXIII §§ 28-33, pp. 10-11 (American
Press ed. 1963). Professor Brandon Brown identified the failure to support legal rights
without any corresponding legal duties as "an erroneous deviation" from the original
meaning of natural law. Brown, "Natural Law and the Law-Making Function in
American Jurisprudence," 15 Notre Dame Law. 9, 14 (1939).
This relationship of "rights" or "immunities" and "duties" was reflected in earlier
Reconstruction legislation. On March 1, 1866, in the House of Representatives floor
discussion of § 1 of the Civil Rights Bill, James F. Wilson of Iowa, who managed
the bill in the House, posed the rhetorical question, "What is an immunity?" He
commented, "Simply 'freedom or exemption from obligation' . . . It merely secures to
citizens of the United States equality in the exemptions of the law. A colored person
shall not, because he is colored, be subjected to obligations, duties, pains and penal-
ties ... Whatever exemptions there may be shall apply to all citizens alike... ." Cong.
Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866). Consistent with this, it should be noted that
§ 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 made specific marginal reference to rights and
obligations, and the Act indicated that white and colored citizens "shall be subject to
like punishment, pains, and penalties." 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
27 Id. § 29 at 10.
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expressed in recent formal natural rights declarations. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights identified duties of the individual to
the community as correlative to "the free and full development of
his personality."28 On the other hand, the European Social Charter
did not refer to either duty or responsibility. 9
If a right is an immunity, there is no correlative duty, since an
immunity is a freedom from control of another and the individual is
under no duty in the exercise of his freedom. An "absolute" principle
is not circumscribed by exceptions or limitations since it is not state
inspired. A claim, on the other hand, is an affirmative assertion which
is derived from the state. Hohfeld said that the clue to the concept
"right," when used as a synonym for claim, lies in the correlative
"duty."30 These distinguishable concepts give rise to different legal
doctrines.
Under the Classical theory, the denial of a right (a claim) will
be upheld only if it furthers the common good. Such rights or claims
are not absolute, and originate in an ideal, not in a social compact.
Conversely, a right in the "absolute" sense is an immunity. It is a
restriction on governmental power and is not socially conditioned.
Locke's philosophy, on the other hand, is an admixture of two
contradictory concepts-immunities and the common good (which is
derived from claims). Immunities achieve their force through restraint,
and are not concomitant with value judgments. Contrariwise, the
"common good" stresses judgmental factors in the assertion or further-
ance of claims. In a 'specific situation, there cannot be a coalescence
of a restraint and a claim, since they are directed towards contradictory
results. Each relationship must be delimited to either one or the other
accomplishment; they cannot individually pursue both, just as an
animal cannot be both a dog and a cat. By their nature, they are mu-
tually exclusive of each other. However, Locke's theory suggests such
contradictory commingling and fallaciously portends systematic pro-
jection.
To pursue the problem further, a "privilege" is "one's freedom
from the right or claim of another."31 It is the legal freedom of a
person as against another to do an act or a legal freedom not to do
an act?2 It is significant that this freedom is provided by the state
28 The Declaration was adopted on December 10, 1948, by the General Assembly
of the United Nations. Art. 29.
29 Signed on October 19, 1961, by the members of the Council of Europe. European
Treaty Series No. 35.
30 Hohfeld, op. cit. svpra note 25, at 38.
81 Hohfeld, op. cit. supra note 25, at 7.
32 1 Restatement, Property § 2 (1936),
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and is not inalienable. The government has or is granted power and
in turn grants privileges. Privileges may be granted with limitations
and their exercise may be subject to regulatory compliance or con-
ditions. On the other hand, immunities stem from liberty in the people,
which is beyond the power of the government to restrict.
The words "right" for "privilege," "right" for "immunity," and
"privilege" for "immunity" are used indiscriminately. The effect is a
discordant variety of protection under each conceptual category, al-
though all are identified as "rights." Since the conceptions affect pow-
ers and benefits differently, they should be viewed hierarchically and
not kaleidoscopically.
IV. THE SCOPE OF NATURAL RIGHTS
Some differences are clearly visible when James Kent's descrip-
tion of the rights of persons is compared with more modern identifica-
tions of economic and social rights. Kent, the American Blackstone,
classified the rights of persons as either absolute or relative. Absolute
rights belong to individuals in a single, unconnected state, while rela-
tive rights are those which arise from civil and domestic affairs.P3
Kent subdivided absolute rights into rights of personal security, per-
sonal liberty, and acquisition and enjoyment of property. This distinc-
tion was an early recognition of the difference between immunities,
which are perceived as absolute rights, and claims which are described
as relative rights.
Some modern theorists, influenced by the industrial era, have
made no such distinction between absolute and relative rights. Instead,
they have broadened the scope of natural rights to include claims under
economic and social rights. For example, Jacques Maritain listed an
array of rights of the working man-rights to form trade unions, to
a just wage, to work itself, to the joint ownership and joint manage-
ment of an enterprise wherever an associative system can be sub-
stituted for the wage system, to relief, to unemployment insurance, to
sick benefits and to social security.34
In his dynamic encyclical letter, Pacem in Terris, Pope John
XXIII identified man's economic rights with free initiative and the
right to a job.35 Related to these rights is the right to satisfactory
working conditions in which physical health is not endangered, with
special attention given to the young and to women. The enumerated
rights extended "to the means which are necessary and suitable for
33 2 Kent, Commentaries on American Law 1 (1st ed. 1827).
34 Maritain, Rights of Man and Natural Law 113-14 (1945).
35 Pacem in Terris, supra note 26, § 18 at 7.
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the proper development of life. These means are primarily food, cloth-
ing, shelter, rest, medical care, and finally the necessary social ser-
vices." 6 The latter functions include the right to security in cases of
sickness, widowhood, old age, unemployment, or in any other situation
where a human being, without fault, is deprived of the means of sub-
sistence. A worker's right to a just wage, consistent with human dignity,
is also imposed.37
Another modem agency which has enlarged the scope of natural
rights is the United Nations. Articles 22 through 26 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights expanded them to include economic
and social rights3 8 These rights extended beyond the traditional rights
to encompass the right to work, to periodic holidays with pay, and
to employment security. The Universal Declaration enumerated other
economic and social rights-the right to choose a job, to join a trade
union, to equal pay for equal work, and to an adequate standard of
living, including housing, medical care and security in the event of
sickness, widowhood or old age.
Maurice Cranston, the English political philosopher, in a percep-
tive study of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,3 9 stated
that the United Nations is the organization best suited to influence the
spread of human rights; however, he felt that the Universal Declara-
tion confused traditional natural rights with ideals which may have
no positive law foundation. Political considerations have prevented the
execution of the covenants necessary to make the Universal Declara-
tion a legally binding instrument. In 1953, the United States delegate
on the Commission for Human Rights announced that the United
States did not intend to sign any treaty on human rights drafted by
the United Nations." This reservation stemmed from a concern that
the adoption of the covenants would threaten American sovereignty,
since a treaty adopted by the Senate would become the supreme law
of the land. In addition, such political uneasiness was aggravated by
the United Nation's action in regarding both sets of rights-civil and
political, and economic and social-as equally authentic. But there is
no unanimity of opinion that the right to "holidays with pay" stands
36 Id. § 11 at S.
37 Id. § 20 at 8.
38 The European Convention on Human Rights (1950) is a European continuation
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but it does not cover economic and
social rights. To that extent, it is not as broad as the Universal Decaration; however,
as a convention, it is legally stronger than a declaration, and the contracting parties
are mutually bound by its provisions.
39 Cranston, What Are Human Rights? (1962).
40 U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/SR.340 (1953).
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in the same relative position of paramount importance as do tradi-
tional natural rights.
The distinction between immunities and claims becomes increas-
ingly important in relation to civil and economic rights. Civil and po-
litical rights are immunities against encroachments of government.
They are protections against excesses of government, ensuring freedom
of speech, religion, press and assembly, fair trial, security against ar-
bitrary arrest and other historic rights. Economic and social rights are
the affirmative claims of the individual against government.
President John Kennedy carefully drew this distinction, identi-
fying immunities as civil liberties and claims as civil rights. He said:
By civil rights we mean those claims which the citizen has to the
affirmative assistance of government. In an age which demands that
government secure the weak from needless dread and misery,
the catalogue of civil rights is never closed. The obligation of govern-
ment in the area of civil rights is never wholly discharged.... The
Bill of Rights, in the eyes of its framers, was a catalogue of im-
munities, not a schedule of claims. It was, in other words, a Bill
of Liberties ... When civil rights are seen as claims and civil lib-
erties as immunities, the government's differing responsibilities
become clear. For the security of rights the energy of government
is essential. For the security of liberty restraint is indispensable.41
In line with this distinction, civil or economic rights, functioning
as claims, are structured in legislation while civil liberties or immuni-
ties are constitutionally protected. This separation wisely suggests a
constitutional delimitation of historic rights and a developmental
pattern of economic and social activities through legislation. Liberty
is preserved through constitutional assurances that prevent govern-
mental encroachments, and economic and social change is reenforced
by legislative action.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
In the formative period of our history, which preceded the in-
dustrial stage, the immunity principle was invoked and natural rights
were protected from legislative attack. In Calder v. Bull, 2 Justice
Chase stated that legislative obligation, in a government established
under the social compact, "must be determined by the nature of the
power on which it is founded." Thus, an act of the legislature which
conflicts with "the great first principles of the social compact, cannot
41 Quoted by Edward Bennett Williams, Inside Labor," Columbus Citizen-Journal,
July 15, 1965, pt. 2, p. 2.
42 3 Dall. (3 US.) 386, 388 (1798).
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be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority." Abuses,
which "authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or . . . take
away that security for personal liberty, or private property, for the
protection whereof the government was established," are denied legal
force. In other early cases involving legislative violation of property
rights, the philosophy of Locke, with its emphasis on the preservation
of property rights, was restated. 3
From the 1870's to the 1930's the Supreme Court emphasized
that the very essence of liberty was freedom from governmental inter-
ference in private economic and property matters.4 Rights of prop-
erty and freedom to contract were conceived to be the "natural rights"
of persons and corporations. The landmark decisions are well-known.
Munn v. Illinois45 held a law fixing maximum charges for the storage
of grain in warehouses to be violative of due process. Lochner v. New
York46 declared a statute limiting the working hours in bakeries to
be unconstitutional. Minimum wages for women in the District of Co-
lumbia, as prescribed by Congressional statute, were ruled in Adkins
v. Childrens' Hospital4 7 to be void. The authority of a state to regulate
competition by restricting the issuance of licenses for the manufacture,
sale or distribution of ice in an area in the absence of proof of con-
venience and necessity was denied in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman s
But these interests were not specifically prescribed by the Con-
stitution. Nor were they immunities embracing the same restrictions
as the integrity of one's physical person or the legal right of ownership
of property. Instead they opened a large arena of claims which Roscoe
Pound described as interests.4
Justice McKenna, in the Arizona Employers' Liability Cases ob-
jected to such distinction for he said that it menaced all rights, "sub-
jecting them unreservedly to conceptions of public policy."5 0 However,
as Dean Pound said, "The Fourteenth Amendment did not set up
43 For cases and articles supporting this thesis, see Bodenheimer, "Due Process
of Law and Justice" in Essays in Jurisprudence in Honor of Roscoe Pound 463, 464-68
(Newman ed. 1962).
44 This early twentieth century approach to economic philosophy has been variously
identified. Justice Holmes, in his famous Lochner dissent, 198 US. 45 (1905), described
it as the embodiment of Herbert Spencer's Social Statics theory. Id. at 75. But such
laissez-faire interpretation of due process also is similar to the traditional natural-rights
approach, especially in extolling private rights and in supporting business assertiveness.
45 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
46 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
47 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
48 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
49 Pound, "A Survey of Social Interests," 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1943).
50 250 U.S. 400, 439 (1919).
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these or any other individual interests as absolute legal rights. It im-
posed a standard upon the legislator. It said to him that if he trenched
upon these individual interests he must not do so arbitrarily. His ac-
tion must have some basis in reason."'"
A. The Balancing of Interests
The transformation of natural rights into interests arose through
different metaphysical and social concepts. Natural rights had its
origin in ontology. To Locke, rights were innate, self-contained pla-
tonic essences requiring governmental acquiescence. The social compact
served as a convenient assumption to limit the power of government.
Through it was introduced the political conception of "inalienable
rights," for under the law of nature no man can alienate to the govern-
ment arbitrary power over himself.
Our Bill of Rights as originally conceived, embodied this popular
notion of government, and the judiciary drew its philosophy from
these originative sources. So long as our society functioned under a
free land economy and the people were agriculturally identified, the
immunity doctrine continued as the ideological expression of the
group. But the growth of industrialism, with its attending economic
and social problems, presented new issues which could not be ignored.
State legislatures attempted to correct some of the serious labor and
wage abuses of the time by introducing remedial legislation. But the
Supreme Court generally sustained the proposition that the rights
of property and freedom to contract were natural rights and were not
subject to governmental interference. Thus, remedial legislation was
consistently overridden by the Court until the 1930's.
Roscoe Pound, in a careful study in 1909, pointed out that the
early eighteenth century exponents of natural law said nothing about
this "right of free contract."52 Their concern was chiefly with security
of the person and of property. Liberty of contract emanated as a theory
of political economy, specifically as a by-product of Adam Smith's
laissez faire thinking.53 Pound described this judicial attitude toward
social legislation as individualistic, exaggerating the importance of
property and contract and "private right at the expense of the public
right."54
In 1933, Professor Morris R. Cohen made a similar attack on
the social indifference of the courts. He said:
51 Pound, supra note 49, at 4.
52 Pound, 'Uiberty of Contract," 1S Yale L.J. 454 (1909).
53 Id. at 456.
5 Id. at 457.
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[T]he bills of rights, originally intended to protect men against
political oppression, have become the legal basis of economic
exploitation. The principal device by which this has been achieved
is the invention of a new legal doctrine previously unknown to juris-
prudence, to wit, that the right to make contracts is itself property.
The blind acceptance of this new dogma has led to the conclusion-
a veritable reductio ad absurdum-that a minimum wage law which
prevents a human being from working under conditions of starvation
is a taking-away of his property.55
This judicial intransigence evoked antagonism both to the theory
of natural rights and to the social practices it was protecting. The
reaction to these principles in the late 1930's and following is well-
known. The Supreme Court has overruled its earlier decisions in this
area and there is little likelihood that these doctrines will be revived.
Remedial state legislation now is presumed to be constitutional, and
the exercise of property and contract rights is subject to curtailment
in the public interest.
These changes have been instituted by the introduction of new phi-
losophies or the modification of old ones. Thus, Locke has given way
to Rousseau with his equalitarian emphasis. Classical Natural Law
is experiencing revival and reacceptance in some quarters. Greater
stress is being given to social institutions through the application of
historical and sociological jurisprudence. And pragmatism has blos-
somed into a mature concept.
Among these new doctrines is the balancing-of-interests test which
is founded on pragmatism, with its concept of fulfillment of expecta-
tions. Dean Pound defined an interest "as a demand or desire which
human beings . . . seek to satisfy, of which, therefore, the ordering
of human relations must take account. '5 6 A shift is noticeable from
one of adjusting the exercise of free wills to one of satisfying wants,
where the free exercise of will is merely one of a number of factors.
Pound, in following Jhering's classification, distinguished between in-
dividual, public and social interests. Thus, the "rights" identified by
Justice McKenna in the Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, as men-
acing judgment to all rights and subjecting them to the precepts of
55 Cohen, Law and the Social Order 149-50 (1933).
56 Pound, My Philosophy of Law 249, 259 (1941).
Glanville Williams objected to this definition of interest because of obscurity.
Williams, "Language and the Law," 62 Law Q. Rev. 387, 398 (1946). In the area of
psychological desire, he contended, one may have rights that one does not desire or is
unaware of. But this is polemical. A claim evolves from an event or a relationship of
events, and psychological desire may be an incidental or inconsequential factor.
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public policy, 7 were identified by Pound as individual interests or
individual claims which can be secured through regular legal machinery.
The Fourteenth Amendment did not establish these individual rights
as "absolute legal rights." In securing such individual rights, policy was
embraced by the courts.
Pound indicated that men sought vigorously in the last century
"to insure complete security through absolute certainty and uniformity
in judicial administration.""' This was attempted through a code sys-
tem which failed. It was followed by "a method of mechanical, logical
deduction from fixed legal conceptions." But this also was unworkable
and in its place was substituted universal definitions of absolute rights.
Pound saw these rights expressed as a unital social interest in the gen-
eral security, but their segmented structure was inadequate to meet
the conflicting and overlapping interests of a complex socio-economic
system. Thus, another transformation ensued, and the problem of sat-
isfying human claims, demands and desires, and not the machinery
of fulfillment, became the constant byword.
Pound, with his penchant for classification, grouped social in-
terests into six categories, with an initial emphasis on general public
welfare. However, as Professor W. Friedmann has observed, "As soon
as the interests are ranked in a specific order or given any appearance
of exclusiveness or permanence, they lose their character as instru-
ments of social engineering and become a political manifesto. Pound
himself has inserted a certain evaluation by describing the interests
in individual life as the most important of all."59
Further, these interests constitute de facto claims which are valid
in themselves. Thus, the ad hoc balancing test contains no principles
or guides for judicial decision-making.6" The effect is to structure a
system on group consensus and not on any ideas of what is just and
reasonable.
However, while applying the interests test to due process, the
Supreme Court does not follow the popular view. Instead, the Court
sees due process from a rational standpoint, as a fusion of the rights
of the individual and public authority. This ideology was precisely
57 250 U.S. at 439 (1919).
58 Pound, supra note 49, at 9.
59 Friedmann, Legal Theory 296 (4th ed. 1960).
00 Professor Thomas Emerson described the difficulty in relation to judicial
protection to a system of freedom of expression. He admonished that the test "frames
the issues in such a broad and undefined way, is in effect so unstructured, that it can
hardly be described as a rule of law at all. . . . The ad hoc balancing test contains no
hard core of doctrine to guide a court in reaching its decision." Emerson, "Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment," 72 Yale L.J. 877, 912 (1963).
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expressed by Justice Frankfurter in Hannah v. Larche, where the
constitutionality of the procedure followed by the Civil Rights Com-
mission in the examination of witnesses was raised:
Since due process is the constitutional axis on which decision must
turn, our concern is not with absolutes, either of governmental power
or of safeguards protecting individuals. Inquiry must be directed to
the validity of the adjustment between these clashing interests-
that of government and of the individual, respectively-in the
procedural scheme devised by the Congress and the Commission.
Whether the scheme satisfies those strivings for justice which due
process guarantees, must be judged in the light of reason drawn
from the considerations of fairness that reflect our traditions of legal
and political thought, duly related to the public interest Congress
sought to meet by this legislation as against the hazards or hardship
to the individual that the Commission procedure would entail.61
The balancing test also has been applied to the provisions of
the Constitution which, like the first amendment, are couched in spe-
cific language, and do not seem to lend themselves to the range of
values created by the balancing of interests. The members of the
Supreme Court are in sharp disagreement with the application of the
balancing test to such provisions.
This conflict is seen in Barenblatt v. United States,62 which in-
volved a former graduate student and teaching fellow at the University
of Michigan who, when summoned to testify before a Subcommittee
of the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities,
refused to answer questions as to whether he was then or had ever
been a member of the Communist Party. Disclaiming reliance on the
privilege of self-incrimination and relying on the first, ninth and
tenth amendments, he objected to the Subcommittee's inquiry into
his "political" and "religious" belief or "other personal or private
affairs" or "associated activities." His conviction of a misdemeanor
for such refusal was sustained by the Supreme Court.
Justice Black dissented, with Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Douglas concurring in the dissent. The majority did not deny the un-
equivocal words of the first amendment that Congress shall pass no
law abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly or petition, and
the Committee's activities, in Black's opinion, abridged the first
amendment "through exposure, obloquy and public scorn.1 63 But the
Court permitted this infringement for three reasons, the first of which
61 363 U.S. 420, 487 (1960).
62 360 U.S. 109 (1958).
63 360 U.S. at 140.
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is pertinent to this discussion, holding that despite the language of
the first amendment, "Congress can abridge speech and association
if this Court decides that the governmental interest in abridging speech
is greater than an individual's interest in exercising that freedom."
The dissent objected to the balancing process being applied to
laws directly abridging first amendment freedoms. Justice Black argued
that the application of the balancing test in such circumstance was
like reading the first amendment to say "Congress shall pass no law
abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition, unless
Congress and the Supreme Court reach the joint conclusion that on
balance the interest of the Government in stifling these freedoms is
greater than the interest of the people in having them exercised." He
reasserted his view that "the Bill of Rights means what it says," and
that it was this meaning which should be enforced. Any other inter-
pretation invited the breach of our great charter of liberty and fos-
tered the application of an indiscernible range of value judgments. In
that context, the first amendment and other provisions of the Bill
of Rights would be enforced only when the Court believed that the
action was reasonable. 4 Such extrapolation, the dissenters argued,
runs counter to the written Constitution.
Justice Black made a further discerning criticism of the applica-
tion of the test in this case. He contended that the Court balanced
improper factors by weighing the right of government to preserve
itself against an individual's right to refrain from disclosing his Com-
munist associations. Such balancing failed to identify and to consider
the social interest in the individual's silence "the interest of the people
as a whole in being able to join organizations, advocate causes and
make political 'mistakes' without later being subjected to governmental
penalties for having dared to think for themselves."65 It is society's in-
terests, rather than the individual's right to silence, which he claimed
the Court should weigh against the need for governmental preservation.
This observation is consistent with Pound's thesis. Pound warned
that a social interest should only be balanced against a social interest
and not against an individual interest. Specifically, in this situation,
the interest of the Government to preserve itself should be balanced
64 The merits of the issue of govermental security, raised in this case, need not be
evaluated here. Each situation, affecting the first amendment and other enumerated
rights, to which the balancing test is applied requires independent consideration.
A real danger of the balancing test, Justice Black warned elsewhere, is that in times
of emergency and pressure the government is given the power to act as it thinks
necessary to protect itself, regardless of individual rights. Black, "The Bill of Rights,"
35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 865, 878 (1960).
65 360 U.S. at 144.
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against the public's interest in free association and free political ad-
vocacy and not against the individual's right as a person to refrain
from revealing Communist affiliations. To state the question in terms
of social and individual interests is to invite a predetermination of the
solution. As Pound said, "In weighing or valuing claims or demands
with respect to their claims or demands, he (we) must be careful to
compare them on the same plane. If we put one as an individual in-
terest and the other as a social interest we may decide the question in
advance in our very way of putting it."66 Here, it could mean pre-
determining Barenblatt's guilt.
But in another sense, Justice Black's position was paradoxical.
He acknowledged that in cases which primarily regulate conduct and
only indirectly affect speech, the balancing test is acceptable "if the
effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the
conduct. ' 67 Thus, the right of a city to control its streets68 or to pro-
hibit the distribution of handbills to prevent littering69 are recognized.
But if free speech is an immunity, as we previously observed, the gov-
ernment has no power to restrain the speech of an individual, even to
regulate human conduct. It is not a matter of degree, but of power,
and if logic is to prevail, the government cannot properly assume power
if it lacks it. Why in the regulation of conduct does the absolutist
give conduct primacy over free speech? The answer, perhaps, is based
on practicality, rather than logic or theory, since the government
could not long exist without placing some necessary restraints on in-
dividuals.
Another criticism of the balancing approach, voiced by Justice
Black, is that it restores us to the state of legislative supremacy which
our Founding Fathers tried to avoid.70 Under this arrangement, our
form of government is changed from one of limited powers to a gov-
ernment in which Congress is free to do anything that the Court con-
siders "reasonable." The judiciary is denied its constitutional power
to evaluate acts of Congress in accordance with criteria established
in the Bill of Rights. The Court, concurrently with Congress, has
even greater power, "that of overriding the plain commands of the
Bill of Rights on a finding of weighty public interest."171
But Black argued that this balancing was achieved by the
66 3 Pound, Jurisprudence 328 (1959).
67 360 U.S. at 141.
68 Cantwel v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
69 Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
70 Black, supra note 64, at 878-79.
71 Id. at 879.
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Framers, when they wrote the Constitution and the Bill of Rights,
and should not be repeated. Each safeguard required a balancing of
interests which the Framers decided, regardless of the risks involved.
Thus, protecting speech might involve dangers to a government; strict
procedures might free guilty men. In Justice Black's opinion, the
Constitution settled differences where disparate values prevail as to
individual liberties. He contended that these differences have been
composed and should not be changed without constitutional amend-
ment.
Ontologically speaking, this was an attempt to explain the source
of rights. But as an interpretation it embodied an immutable concept
of natural rights, which was neither intended by the Framers nor by
the Classical Natural Law theorists. Natural rights are not innate,
self-contained essences in the Platonic sense as Justice Black views
them. Neither are they discrete in and of themselves. Instead, as we
have observed, they are acquired, won, derived and obtained. Hence,
they are subject to change, as mores and ethics change.
Justice Black's position is not jurally tenable. The judicial action
affecting natural rights is subject to two opposing jural viewpoints.
One, in the Kent tradition, identifies new subsumptions within constant
categories or concepts.7 The other reflects an extension of rights into
new categories or concepts. If they are subsumptions under the tradi-
tional meaning, then they are "absolutes" or immunities. On the other
hand, if they are new concepts, such "rights" or claims are relative
within Kent's scheme. In other words, are the social and economic
rights enumerated by Pope John, Maritain and others new rights, and
hence relative, or are they merely the extension of the rights of liberty,
property and security, and hence "absolute"? If relative, they fall
under civil rather than constitutional claims. Obviously, Justice Black
invokes the more conservative theory, prescribing as constitutionally
protected rights those which are enumerated.
Justice Black has also attacked the balancing test as being histor-
ically repressive of individual liberty. In his dissent in Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,7 he stated that "the dan-
gerous constitutional doctrine of 'balancing' . . . has been the excuse
of practically every repressive measure the government has ever seen
fit to adopt." Dean Erwin Griswold viewed this verbal attack as an
exaggeration but admitted that the balancing approach is susceptible
72 Freund, "An Analysis of Judicial Reasoning," in Law and Philosophy: A
Symposium 288 (Hook ed. 1964).
73 367 U.S. 1, 164 (1961).
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to such assault.74 Certainly, during periods of political and social ten-
sions, the Court has stressed the theory, applying it without full or
convincing explanation.
Dean Griswold introduced as a by-product of his discussion, a
new approach as a substitute to the balancing test."5 He described it
as the "comprehensive" or "integral" method "since it involves look-
ing to the text of all of the Constitution, and . . . in proper cases,
to the 'unwritten Constitution', examining and considering fully all
relevant texts and conditions of our constitutional system, and inte-
grating all together in reaching the ultimate solution." The Court
examines all constitutional provisions in their total setting, reaching
its conclusion in relation to all relevant language and factors. This is
an extension beyond the absolutist's approach who concentrates his
attention on the specific language of the Constitution, ignoring all
other considerations. However, it is difficult to distinguish Griswold's
approach from the balancing test prescribed by Justice Frankfurter
in the Hannah case for due process matters.
Another major weakness of the balancing test was previously
alluded to-the absence of guideposts in choosing between conflicting
interests. Although Pound recognized that certain interests are to be
encouraged and sponsored, he failed to rank individual and social
interests in relation to their importance. The determinations, which
are made in assigning such preferences, bring to the forefront ques-
tions of value judgment and decisions of social policy. The directions
these judgments take are very important, and mark the course of
social conduct. Without the valuation of such interests, society can
flounder. As one commentator suggested, "Without measuring rods...
the adjustment of such interests would be left either to chance or
happenstance, with fatal consequences for social cohesion and harmony,
or to the arbitrary fiat of a group having the power to enforce it."76
Much of the difficulty is apparently due to the great emphasis
Pound placed on pragmatic thinking in the application of the balanc-
ing test. Asserted demands of the public, under this arrangement, are
stressed to the detriment of reasonable claims. Thus, the balancing
theory rests on the shifting sands of public demand rather than on a
comprehension of and an evaluation of social requirements. 7
74 Griswold, "Absolute Is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the
Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions," 8 Utah L. Rev. 167 (1963). See also
Frantz, "The First Amendment in the Balance," 71 Yale LJ. 1424 (1962).
75 Ibid.
76 Bodenheimer, jurisprudence 263 (1962).
7T One is reminded of Edmund Burke's critical comment about natural rights:
"By having a right to everything they (people) want everything." 2 Works of
Edmund Burke 332 (Standard Library Ed. 1906).
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B. The Libertarian Theory
Another theory of natural rights has evolved through jural con-
struction and constitutional interpretation. This can be described as
the "libertarian" approach, in which an emphasis is placed on human
freedom and dignity. The exponents of this theory, which includes
such eminent jurists as Brandeis and Douglas, are supporters of civil
liberties, rather than harbingers of natural law. They adapt to each
social situation the fundamental principle that individual freedom is
the objective of civilized society. The ultimate goal of the state is the
guarantee of freedom to the ordinary individual, with maximum oppor-
tunity for him to develop his faculties, to realize his ambitions, and
to satisfy his desires. Thus, as Brandeis stated in his famous Olmstead
dissent:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions
of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
American beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone
-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.78
Brandeis' thesis was that an extension of individual rights is essen-
tial to cope with new encroachments and abuses as they are socially
designed and furthered. In this context, the right to be let alone is the
matrix of a full sphere of constitutional protections and safeguards.
Mr. Justice Douglas repeatedly has emphasized the same thesis
in clear terms.
Government exists for man, not man for government. The aim of
government is security for the individual and freedom for the
development of his talents .... There is, indeed, a congeries of these
rights that may conveniently be called the right to be let alone. They
concern the right of privacy-sometimes explict and sometimes
implicit in the Constitution. This right of privacy protects freedom
of religion and freedom of conscience. It protects the privacy of the
home and the dignity of the individual .... 79
In discussing the right to be let alone, I have spoken . . . mostly
of opinions, beliefs, and matters of conscience. But the right of
privacy covers another domain. I refer to the sanctity of the home
and the right of the citizen to be unmolested there, either by
peeping toms or by lawless police on a raid .... 89
78 Olnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
79 Douglas, The Right of the People 87 (1958).
S Id. at 144. But elsewhere in the same lectures, Justice Douglas spoke in almost
19661
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
Under this theory, the privacy of the home and the dignity of
the individual encompass a full range of modem activities which should
be protected. They cover wiretapping and the use of electronic devices
to elicit private conversations. They extend to the issue of the captive
audience on streetcars,8 ' and the right to travel. 2 And, as Justice
Douglas indicated, they draw their substance from penumbras.
C. The Privileges Theory
We conclude the catalogue of theories of natural rights with a
less popular doctrine-the privileges approach. 83 This thesis invokes
the principle that natural rights are privileges granted by the state;
therefore, they are not inalienable and are subject to interpretative
limitations and judicial inclusions and exclusions, as are any other
state-produced law, although these rights are subject to the common
good. The free person is a creation of the state, and an individual
achieves his rights through the state. Thus, as Hegel asserted, the state
is the superior realization of the moral idea. The individual has liberty
traditional natural-law language: "The penumbra of the Bill of Rights reflects human
rights, which though not explicit, are implied from the very nature of man as a child
of God. These human rights were the products both of political thinking and of moral
and religious influences." Id. at 89-90. In fact, one writer concluded that justice
Douglas believes "that privacy is a fundamental right derived from natural law2
Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. Rev. 813, 81 (1966). But the last quoted sentence, above,
which the writer omitted, seemingly removed him from the sphere of traditional
natural-law thinking. Justice Douglas argued that human rights are politically,
morally and religiously conditioned-a step removed from natural law.
81 Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
82 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160 (1941).
S A classification of abstract concepts is precariously elusive and fraught with
uncertainties and danger. My hope is that in these groupings injustice has not been
done to individuals and that viewpoints were not innocently misinterpreted. Neither
should this arrangement be suggestive of a complete inventory of jural theories relating
to the Constitution.
Mr. Justice Brennan has observed that the following theories have been invoked to
interpret the first amendment: the absolute view, "redeeming social value," "dear and
present danger" and "balancing" tests. The "redeeming social value" test primarily
pertains to obscenity cases, and the "clear and present danger" test primarily affects sub-
versive activity. As he noted, each has operated to meet specific regulation and does not
have "an across-the-board application." Brennan, "The Supreme Court and the
Melklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment," 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965). Mr.
justice John Archibald Campbell, who served on the Supreme Court from 1853 to 1861,
was utilitarian in his interpretation of the contract clause. See Schmidhauser, "Jeremy
Bentham, The Contract Clause and Justice John Archibald Campbell," 11 Vand. L. Rev.
801 (1958). For a due process arrangement see Bodenheimer, supra note 43.
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only through the state and only in the state is there a fusion of the will
of the individual and the general will. This, of course, is a rejection
of the theories of natural rights as traditionally espoused.
Rights do not come to us from nature, which knows no right except
cunning and strength; they are privileges assured to individuals by
the community as advantages to the common good. Liberty is a
luxury of society; the free individual is a product and a mark of
civilization. 4
This theory has been applied occasionally and peripherally in
lacunal interpretations of natural rights. This is especially discern-
ible in defining the police power of the state. In the Billado case the
defendants' application for a first-class license to sell malt and vinous
beverages in their restaurant was denied without a hearing.8 The
Vermont Supreme Court held that although the economic right of
doing business is a natural right, the sale of intoxicating liquors is
not, and if it is a right at all it is subject to the police power of the
state. The Court concluded that it is a mere privilege which may be
granted, denied or withdrawn by the state.
In a similar situation, the United States Supreme Court held
earlier that a citizen had no inherent right to sell intoxicating liquors
by retail.8 But the Court went further, arguing that it is neither a
privilege of a citizen of a state or of a citizen of the United States.
"As it (selling intoxicating liquors) is a business attended with danger
to the community it may . . . be entirely prohibited, or be permitted
under such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils."8 7 Nonethe-
less, this constitutes a privilege. But adverting to Lockian concepts,
Mr. Justice Field observed that even liberty, the greatest of all rights,
is not unrestricted license. "It is only freedom from restraint under
conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others.
It is then liberty regulated by law."88 Within the police power, "the
possession and enjoyment of ...rights are subject to such reason-
able conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the
country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order and morals
of the community."8
84 Durant, Our Oriental Heritage 29 (1942).
This is not to be confused with "privileges and immunities," as the phrase is used in
the Constitution.
85 State ex rel. Bihado v. Wheelock, 114 Vt. 350, 45 A.2d 430 (1946).
86 Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890).
ST 137 US. at 91.
88 137 US. at 89-90.
89 137 US. at 89.
1966]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
VI. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Two substantial jural issues were presented by the Griswold
case: (1) Is the right of privacy a natural right? (2) If so, is it consti-
tutionally protected? If these questions are answered affirmatively, an
ancillary issue is raised. Is forbidding the use of contraceptives an
invasion of that right?
The principle that the right of privacy is a natural right is sup-
ported by several theories. It is in accord with Classical Natural Law
thinking, as demonstrated by Article 12 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. The Declaration, based on natural law, states that
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation."
Traditional natural law also has given support to this thesis. In
the landmark case of Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.,9" the
Georgia Supreme Court applied the immunity rule to the right of pri-
vacy in tort law. The Court said:
The right of privacy, or the right of the individual to be let alone
is a personal right, which is not without judicial recognition. It is
the complement of the right to the immunity of one's person.91
As was previously noted, the concept also received approbation
from the libertarians. This was underscored in Mr. Justice Brandeis'
dissent in the Olmstead case, in which he argued that the right of pri-
vacy should be protected as a violation of the fourth amendment,
although the majority held that petitioner's privacy had not been
invaded in the absence of a technical search and seizure. 2
Constitutional protection of the right to be let alone also derives
substance from Mr. Justice Douglas' thesis that the guarantee emerges
from several provisions of the Constitution, including the fourth and
fifth amendments. 3 The right of privacy as an independent right,
apart from protection of the individual in criminal proceedings, emerged
from the "liberty" concept in the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
In York v. Story,94 the ninth federal circuit held that privacy was
90 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
91 Id. at 213, 50 S.E. at 78.
92 See Comment, "Privacy After Griswold: Constitutional or Natural Law?" 60
Nw. U.L. Rev. 813 (1966) for a history of the Supreme Court's activity in this area
as it relates to search and seizure and other developments.
93 Douglas, op. cit. supra note 79, at 88.
9 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963). This action was brought by the plaintiff against
three police officers to recover damages under the Civil Rights Act for taking and
distributing photographs of her in the nude. The plaintiff had come to the police station
to complain of an assault. One defendant, acting under color of his authority and over
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protectable under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The concept of privacy was extended to include anti-contracep-
tive law in Poe v. Ullman 5 In his dissent in the Poe case, Justice
Douglas contended that the right of privacy covered the Connecticut
law"0 and that the law deprived petitioners, a married couple, of "lib-
erty" without due process of law under the fourteenth amendment.
However, "due process" in that context is not restricted and limited to
the first eight amendments. 7 Freedom to travel, the right "to marry,
establish a home and bring up children," and the right of privacy of
captive radio audiences were cited by Justice Douglas as evolvements
of other specific assurances. "Liberty", under this thesis, "gains con-
tent from the emanations of other specific guarantees . . . or from
the experience with the requirements of a free society."98
In the Griswold case, Mr. Justice Douglas pursued the same
thesis but did not repeat the formulary principles which he developed
in Poe. However, in Griswold he placed greater emphasis on the pen-
umbras, which are created among the specific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights and the emanations formed from them. The penumbras are
not a new and novel notion, as has been suggested, but have a deriva-
five, not a different content. 9 The emanations form what Justice
Douglas described as "zones of privacy," such as the right of associa-
tion, the prohibition against the quartering of soldiers in any house
in time of peace without the consent of the owner, and the right against
self-incrimination.
Significantly, Justice Douglas stated "that specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from these
guarantees that help give them life and substance.1" 0 He then made
plaintiff's objections, photographed her in the nude and in indecent positions. The Court
held that such acts constituted an arbitrary intrusion upon the security of her privacy,
as guaranteed to her by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Therefore,
a foundation for proving her claim under the Civil Rights Act was laid.
Or 367 US. 497 (1961). The inclusion of the Connecticut anti-contraceptive law
under privacy would receive doubtful Classical Natural Law support.
96 Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 53-32 (1958 rev.): "Any person who uses any drug,
medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined
not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one
year or be both fined and imprisoned."
97 367 U.S. at 515.
98 367 U.S. at 517. For a criticism of the penumbral doctrine see Bodenheimer,
"Birth Control Legislation and the United States Supreme Court," 14 Kan. L. Rev.
453 (1966).
09 Comment supra note 92, at 825.
1o 381 U.S. at 484. One may question the conclusiveness of analogical reasoning, but
that is not germane to the immediate issue. Case discussion is essentially limited to
jural questions.
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a referential statement: "See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-522
(dissenting opinion)." In the dissenting opinion to Poe, Justice
Douglas elaborated on the libertarian theory. He incorporated this
approach by reference in the Griswold case, using the penumbra to
support that thesis. Thus, the full meaning of the concept is best
achieved by reading the two opinions together.
Justices Harlan and White, in two concurring opinions, followed
a more expansive treatment of the libertarian concept. They approved
it, but its endorsement was achieved by utilizing infringement of due
process without the penumbral appendage. Justice Harlan felt that
the Connecticut statute infringed the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment because the law violated fundamental values "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'1 1 Inquiry may be aided by
resort to one or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, but the
protection is not dependent on them. As Justice Harlan graphically
stated, "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands
. . . on its own bottom."
Justice Black, in his dissent, rejected the due-process argument
which Justices Harlan and White espoused, contending that it re-
flected the same "natural law due process philosophy" embodied in
Lochner and other cases. He did not believe that the Supreme Court
was granted power by the due process clause or other constitutional
provisions to measure constitutionality "by our belief that legislation
is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or accomplishes no justifiable
purpose, or is offensive to our own notions of 'civilized standards by
conduct.'" Justice Black considered such evaluation of legislation as
an element in the legislative law-making process and not within the
interpretative power of the courts. Therefore, such authority should
remain with Congress and the States, who formulate laws in accor-
dance with their own judgment of "fairness and wisdom." The courts,
in his opinion, should not substitute their judgment for that of the
legislature.
But it would seem that Justices Harlan and White did not, as
Justice Black suggested, invoke a natural-law theory. Instead, they
101 381 U.S. at 800 quoting from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
This theory of Justice Harlan also has been identified as the "ordered liberty"
approach. Comment, "The Supreme Court, 1964 Term," 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 163 (1965).
However, neither it nor the penumbral approach reflects significant philosophical
differences; nor do they vary much in their results. For these reasons they were given
a common designation.
Justice Harlan also argued that the majority opinion implicitly endorsed the theory




applied a functional approach, recognizing distinctive differences be-
tween the freedoms protected by the Constitution. It is such inter-
pretation which has fostered "preferred freedoms" as an ideological
principle in the areas of civil and political rights. The Griswold case
is a further projection of this thesis, extending the constitutional pro-
tection of social rights to aspects of the right of privacy. And in the
application of the functional approach, the justices referred to theories
other than natural law for their support, e.g., the libertarian theory.
Mr. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold is expres-
sive of another important jural approach, which previously has not
been discussed, the historical treatment.102 He departed from the nat-
ural-law theory in the determination of fundamental rights not men-
tioned in the Constitution, which should be protected. To ascertain
what these rights are, Justice Goldberg would not search the precepts
of natural law or leave it to the preferences of individual judges but
would rest the determination on "the traditions and (collective) con-
science of our people."' 3
Mr. Justice Black, in his Griswold dissent, was critical of this
historical approach. He asked how judges could avoid applying their
personal notions in cases where the ninth amendment as well as the
due process clause were used by the Supreme Court to declare state
statutes unconstitutional. Computerized information is not available
to the Court to determine what traditions are rooted in the "(collec-
tive) conscience of our people."
Chief Judge Learned Hand recognized that a court had no way
to determine what the "common conscience" at a time may be.104 It
might mean the judgment of "some ethical elite" or a plurality approv-
ing a specific conduct. In the latter situation, it would be absurd to
try and make such a calculation. Judge Hand did not find general
principles helpful as guides, for "almost every moral situation is
unique." He finally concluded that courts are confined to "the best
guess" of the result of a poll, and from that the content of the "com-
mon conscience" would be derived.
Justices Black and Stewart dissented, in separate opinions, on
the theory that the due process clause placed only such limitations
on the states as were specifically enumerated in the provisions of the
Bill of Rights or were incorporated in due process."0 5 Although both
102 He also stressed the ninth amendment as being within the "protected penumbra
of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights." 381 U.S. at 487.
103 381 U.S. at 493, quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
104 Johnson v. United States, 186 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1951).
105 Mr. Justice Stewart disagreed with Mr. Justice Black's thesis that the fourteenth
amendment incorporates all that is contained in the first eight amendments.
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dissented, Justice Stewart followed the traditional approach while
Justice Black applied the absolute test. Justice Black objected to the
Court's identification of "right of privacy" as if it were embodied in
some constitutional provision or provisions, which forbade any law
ever to be passed affecting the abridgment of "privacy." There is
no such explicit prohibition. Justice Black recognized, however, that
guarantees in certain specific constitutional provisions were intended
"in part" to protect privacy, under certain circumstances. The fourth
amendment's guarantee against "unreasonable searches and seizures"
was an example of such a restriction.
Justice Black declared that "One of the most effective ways of
diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to substi-
tute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee an-
other word or words, more or less flexible and more or less restricted
in meaning."'0 6 The right of privacy was an ambiguous, uncertain
substitute for searches and seizures and, in his opinion, was subject
to the vagaries of broad or narrow interpretations. Justice Black ob-
jected to the invalidation of state law, based on a jurally indeterminate
formula of "natural justice," in the absence of specific constitutional
limitation. He found this formula no less dangerous, as applied to
human rights, than when used to enforce economic rights.
Implicit in his emphasis is a developmental pattern of analytical
jurisprudence. Justice Black stressed the meaning of the constitu-
tional provisions in their historical setting and was critical of generali-
ties embodied in natural law. He did not distinguish among several
views or formulas, which he grouped under the caption "natural jus-
tice," and argued that they had the same meaning. But, as we have
seen, there are significant distinctions among the philosophies, as
applied to the Constitution, although the Constitution is framed in
natural-law language. These distinctions have marked relevance in
formulating diverse jural conclusions. Clearly, the libertarian ap-
proach of Justices Douglas and Harlan and the "balancing" test are
distinguishable from each other and from Classical Natural Law, from
Locke's philosophy and from Justice Stewart's traditional emphasis.
In fact, Justice Black's absolute rule is rooted in Lockian thought,
which further differentiates natural law from other philosophical
theories.
Other authorities have supported the analytic interpretation of
the Constitution. Dean Edward Levi stated, "Granted the right and
duty of the court to interpret the document, it has not been given the
106 381 U.S. at 509.
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duty or the opportunity to rewrite the words.' 07 Case law is accept-
able by a later court through an interpretation of words, but reasoning
by example justifies case acceptance on a different theory. However,
Dean Levi did not view such constitutional interpretation as a basis
for projecting a theory, which can be safely followed in the future.
Conflicting values in shifting constitutional interpretation make this
projection problematic.
Professor Herbert Wechsler's contrary argument is "that the
main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be
genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved
in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the
immediate result that is achieved.' 0  Cases should be decided on
"grounds of adequate neutrality and generality, tested not only by the
instant application but by others that the principles imply."
But changes in constitutional interpretation are made for various
reasons. They include "shifting mores, new ethical standards on a
demonstrated need for more economical or workable or fruitful formu-
lations."'0 9 As Professor Paul Freund noted, the emergence of the con-
cept of privacy is a notable example of this process of change.110
Dean Levi is among those who have criticized the Supreme Court
for its methods in reaching decisional results. In the desegregation
case,' the Court rooted its decision in social considerations, ignoring
traditional theory. Dean Levi argued that it is possible that the
same conclusion ought to have been reached in that case, "but with
less of an immediate jump and on the partial basis of an old and ac-
cepted theory."" 2
Levi's position suggests the application of variegated jural theory.
However, such adaption would not always provide desired results in
policy. When there is no difference in result, an interchange of theories
presents no problem, although it might raise some serious ethical con-
siderations. The Brown case conforms to this symmetrical pattern, but
the Griswold case raises another problem, in which the results vary
according to conflicting theories. It is doubtful that Classical Natural
Law theorists would find the conclusion of the Griswold case acceptable.
107 Levi, "The Nature of Judicial Reasoning" in Law and Philosophy: A
Symposium 274 (Hook ed. 1964).
108 Wechsler, "The Nature of Judicial Reasoning," id. at 293-94. See Wechsler,
"Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
109 Freund, "An Analysis of Judicial Reasoning," in Law and Philosophy: A
Symposium 288 (Hook ed. 1964).
110 Ibid.
1l Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
112 Levi, op. cit. supra note 107, at 275.
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Neither is the traditional approach, as expressed by Justice Stewart,
conformable to the majority opinion. Policy, therefore, is not coexten-
sive, nor is it subject to a unital pattern.
The Griswold case stands somewhere near the lacunal fringes
between Levi's "unpredictable" and Wechsler's "neutral principles."
The case suggests the use of the inductive method in reassessing famil-
iar relationships and in evaluating new functions. In the predictable
future, framed in the philosophy of the libertarians, a variety of
"private rights" may be given constitutional efficacy by judicial in-
clusion. An assessment of rights, favorable to the pursuit of happiness,
may extend assurances beyond economic and social satisfactions to
protect, in Brandeis' words, "American beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations." The right to be let alone may, in actu-
ality, become "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men."
CONCLUSION
It should not be disquieting that so many approaches have been
used in applying this phase of constitutional theory in our democracy,
for it reflects the dynamism of a pluralistic society. It is to our ever-
lasting credit that our social instruments have been adapted to meet
changing times and conditions. Perhaps, in some measure, this explains
the success of our democracy and shows why we have made such sig-
nificant and continuous progress through 175 years of constitutional
government. Neither should we despair for lack of a unital philosophy
on the Supreme Court. There, also, the struggles, needs and aspirations
of a disparate society are reflected. Unlike the monolithic English who
follow utilitarian theory, we are a people of may voices and numerous
thoughts. But so long as we permit those voices to be heard and to
challenge our moves, we have naught to fear. Hopefully, by commu-
nication, reflection and understanding, we will find our way to even
greater social heights.
